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This overview chapter explains in general terms the relevance and the 
contributions of this book to economic theory and policy.  The economic theory and 
mathematics developed in chapters two and three derive benchmarks for the optimal debt 
in an environment where both the return on capital and the real rate of interest are 
stochastic variables. The equilibrium real exchange rate, the subject of chapter four, is 
where the real exchange rate is heading. These benchmarks are applied in chapters five 
through nine to answer the following questions. 
•  What is a theoretically based empirical measure of a "misaligned" exchange rate 
that increases the probability of a significant depreciation or a currency crisis? 
•  What is a theoretically based empirical measure of an "excess" debt that increases 
the probability of or a debt crisis?  
•  What is the interaction between an excess debt and a misaligned exchange rate? 
Several historical examples indicate the significance of these questions. Then we 
sketch how the analytical tools developed in part II are applied in parts III and IV to 
answer these questions in a stochastic environment, where the return on capital and real 
interest rate are not predictable.  
In July 1997, the economies of East Asia became embroiled in one of the worst 
financial crises of the postwar period.  Yet, prior to the crisis, these economies were seen 
as models of economic growth experiencing sustained growth rates that exceeded those 
earlier thought unattainable.  Similarly in 1998, the financial markets, the economics 
profession and the International Monetary Fund viewed Argentina as a model of stability 
and growth. In 2001- 02 the Argentine economy defaulted on its huge debt.  
Why did the financial markets, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the bond rating agencies fail to anticipate the crises? In 2004, the International 
Monetary Fund Independent Evaluation Office IEO published a report that reviewed why 
and how, despite the Fund's extensive involvement with Argentina, the Fund was not able 
to help Argentina prevent and better manage the crisis. The primary purpose of the IEO 
evaluation is to draw lessons for the Fund in its future operational work.  
The IEO report stated (pp. 22-23) that there is a general agreement that a 




fiscal policy, a rigid exchange rate regime, and vulnerability to adverse external shocks. 
The IEO could not isolate the relative importance of these factors. "In the absence of the 
underlying vulnerability…the same adverse developments would not have had the 
catastrophic effects that were associated with the crisis, though they may well have 
produced some negative effects."  
The factors underlying vulnerability must be given precise theoretical meaning 
with associated operational measures, to evaluate their explanatory power. The objective 
is to arrive at theoretically justified Early Warning Signals, based upon available 
information. The main reasons for the failures to anticipate balance of payments and debt 
crises were that the theories were based upon deterministic models, which ignored 
uncertainty, or that the theoretical tools were unduly limited in scope. For example, the 
most frequently used method to evaluate whether an exchange rate was misaligned was to 
compare the exchange rate with its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) value. The PPP 
hypothesis assumes that the "equilibrium" real exchange rate is constant, but it does not 
provide a theory to explain what is the equilibrium real exchange rate. Moreover, this 
hypothesis lacks explanatory power
1. Empirical measures to estimate overvaluation 
compared the real exchange rate to its trend value
2. These eclectic empirical measures 
just add a trend to the PPP but cannot explain if an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
is a sign of strength or weakness in the balance of payments. 
The most widely used measures of excess debt, which may lead to a debt crisis, 
focus upon two variables: (i) The ratio of debt/GDP that would result if current policies 
continued into the future, (ii) The trade balance/GDP that would keep the debt/GDP ratio 
equal to its current ratio. It is hypothesized that the higher the number, the more likely is 
it that there would be a debt problem. Empirical researchers concluded that these 
measures lacked explanatory power. 
Since both measures of overvalued exchange rates and excess debt or debt burden 
were inadequate, the implied early warning signals were unreliable. A question that is 
relevant for policy is: what are theoretically based, operational Early Warning Signals 
that have explanatory power? One motive in writing this book is to answer this question. 
                                                 
1 See Breuer (1994), MacDonald and Stein (1999) and Duval (2002). 




Two theoretical tools are developed in this book. The analytical tool to estimate 
and explain the "equilibrium" real exchange rate is the NATREX model, an acronym for 
the natural real exchange rate. This is positive economics. The analytical tool to derive 
the optimal external debt/net worth and expected growth rate in an environment where 
both the productivity of capital and the real interest rate are unpredictable is stochastic 
optimal control dynamic programming (SOC/DP). This is normative economics. Both are 
benchmarks of performance. We then explain the interaction between misaligned 
exchange rates and excess debt that increases the probability of crises.  
Equilibrium exchange rates and sustainable debts are not only relevant to the 
emerging markets, but also to the United States, the Euro area and to enlargement of the 
Euro area. The United States current account has been deeply in deficit in recent years. 
The growing negative net investment position leads to the question: how sustainable is 
the US current account deficit and associated inflow of capital? Is the US debt ratio 
excessive relative to the derived optimal debt ratio? What is the dynamic interaction 
between the real value of the dollar and current account deficits? 
The real value of the Euro relative to the US dollar has fluctuated drastically since 
its inception. A frequently discussed question is whether the value of the US dollar/euro 
has been "misaligned", and what are the effects of policies in the U.S. or in Europe upon 
the exchange rate? A benchmark, the "equilibrium" real exchange rate, is required to 
answer this question. 
The Central and Eastern European Countries CEEC are planning to join the 
European Monetary Union. These countries must establish the nominal values of their 
currencies upon entering Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM-II. How should one evaluate 
the appropriateness of their nominal and real exchange rates? In the last ten years, the real 
values of their currencies measured in terms of tradable goods have been appreciating 
relative to the Euro. A correctly chosen exchange rate is a prerequisite for avoiding the 
depressing effects that occurred with the German reunification. An overvalued exchange 
rate hinders real growth, leads to sustained current account deficits and a large external 
debt. These factors could lead to either a debt crisis or a currency crisis. If the CEEC run 
into financial difficulties then, unlike the Eastern part of Germany which has been 




There is an explicit "no bail- out" clause in the Maastricht treaty (article 104b) that the 
CEEC signed when entering the EU. Moreover, if the exchange rate "disequilibrium" is 
sufficiently great, these countries may be forced to exit from the peg. An undervalued 
exchange rate would generate inflationary pressures that would violate the Maastricht 
criteria for entry into ERM II. We use the NATREX model developed in chapter four to 
evaluate what is an equilibrium exchange rate and to explain the appreciation of the real 
exchange rates of the CEEC: do they reflect strengths or are they Warning Signals of 
currency or debt crises? This question cannot be answered if "misalignment" is measured 
as the deviation of the real exchange rate from its trend. 
The optimality analysis is based upon state of the art techniques of stochastic 
optimal control/dynamic programming (SOC/DP). The reasons for using these techniques 
are that optimization involves inter-temporal decisions. Current decisions not only affect 
current welfare, but they also have consequences for future welfare. The future is 
unpredictable, so that the optimal controls or decisions made at any instant should enter 
as feedback functions of the currently observable state.    
The dynamic programming/stochastic optimal control techniques are widely used 
in the mathematical finance literature published in applied mathematics journals
3, but are 
not widely used by economists. The stochastic optimal control techniques that we use to 
derive the optimal debt are quite technical. An attractive feature of our analysis of the 
optimal long term debt and expected endogenous growth is that we are able to show how 
the SOC/DP equations can be understood in terms of the Tobin-Markowitz mean 
variance M-V approach to portfolio selection
4. Thereby a relatively intuitive and graphic 
explanation - based upon the M-V techniques known to economists - can be given for the 
mathematical results.  
Summary of the theme and contributions  
The subject of this book is equilibrium real exchange rates, optimal external debt 
and their interaction. Our contributions can be summarized. 
                                                 
3 See American Mathematical Society, Contemporary Mathematics, Mathematics of Finance (2004). 
Merton's book on continuous time finance uses these techniques extensively. 
4 Tobin developed the M-V analysis in 1952, several years before its publication, when I was a student in 
his graduate class in macroeconomics. That is why I dedicated the Fleming-Stein (2004) paper in his 




 An explicit growth model is specified that explains how the real exchange rate 
and the external debt are affected by the exogenous and control/policy variables. A 
"story"/scenario is an integral part of the analysis.  
 Our equilibrium exchange rate, which is associated with internal and external 
balance, is called the natural real exchange rate (NATREX), because it is in the spirit of 
Wicksell's natural rate of interest. The medium run NATREX is a flow equilibrium, 
which is similar to the equilibrium concept used by Ragnar Nurske and John 
Williamson
5. The NATREX extends their work by developing the dynamics of capital 
and external debt. There is a trajectory from the medium run to the long run NATREX, 
where there are both flow equilibrium and stock equilibrium.  
The equilibrium real exchange rate can be written as R[Z(t)], where a rise is an 
appreciation and Z(t) is a vector of measurable exogenous and control/policy real 
fundamentals that may vary over time. Misalignment Φ (t) = R(t) - R[Z(t)] is the 
difference between the actual real exchange rate R(t) and the NATREX.  Explicit 
empirical measures of "misalignment" and "excessive debt" are derived from the theory.  
The actual exchange rate differs from the NATREX because of speculative, 
cyclical, and other ephemeral influences with zero expectations, but considerable 
variance. The real exchange rate converges to a band that contains the NATREX. 
Specifically, the trends in the NATREX explain the trends in the real exchange rate. This 
tells us which way the exchange rate is going. If measured misalignment overvaluation 
Φ (t) > 0 is "sufficiently" large and sustained, a significant depreciation or a currency 
crisis is likely to occur. Similarly, if there is a significant undervaluation Φ (t) < 0 and a 
pegged nominal exchange rate, then there will be significant inflationary pressure. 
Currency and debt crisies occur because actual behavior is not optimal. The 
subject of optimal debt, current account and endogenous growth concerns intertemporal 
decision making. The theoretical literature uses the Maximum Principle of Pontryagin or 
the Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC) to derive inter-temporal optimality 
conditions
6. The Maximum Principle is based upon perfect certainty. The trajectory to the 
                                                 
5 See Driver and Westaway on concepts of equilibrium exchange rates. 
6 Gandolfo and Turnovsky review the literature. Infante and Stein showed that this literature requires 
perfect knowledge and certainty, and showed that dynamic programming is a very much better method to 




steady state is unique, so that there is saddle point instability if there are any errors, 
however slight. The IBC constrains the present value of consumption to equal the present 
value of GDP over an infinite horizon
7. This literature is based upon certainty 
equivalence. Because the future GDP and interest rates are unpredictable, the present 
value of GDP over an infinite horizon, the IBC, is unknowable. The IBC is not 
operational and not enforceable. There is no feedback control mechanism to correct 
errors, which are certain to occur. 
 Instead, the techniques of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming 
SOC/DP are used in this book to derive "inter-temporal optimization". We derive the 
optimal external debt/net worth, capital/net worth, consumption/net worth and the 
optimal endogenous expected growth rate in a stochastic environment.  
The optimal debt/net worth f* or capital/net worth, derived from the SOC/DP 
analysis, is measurable for any arbitrary risk aversion. An excessive debt Ψ t = ft - f*t is 
the deviation of the actual debt ratio ft from f*t the optimal ratio. Generally the excess 
debt is produced by government budget deficits. 
The greater is the measured excessive debt Ψ t the lower is the expected growth 
rate of consumption and the higher is its variance. It is therefore the more likely that 
random external shocks will lead to a debt default, rather than to a drastic decline in 
consumption.  
 The two types of crises are interrelated. A depreciation of the currency increases 
the real external debt burden, which raises the probability of a debt crisis. A debt burden 
adversely affects the current account and capital flows, which exert pressure on the 
exchange rate.  We give precision to the concept of "vulnerability" to adverse 
developments on the basis of two theoretically based measures: 
Excess debt     Ψ t = ft - f*t  > 0     ⇒ probability of debt crisis increases 
Misalignment   Φ t = Rt - R[Zt] > 0 ⇒ probability of currency crisis increases;  
Interaction   Probability of currency crisis ! Probability of debt crisis 
  A guided tour  
 
                                                 




A "guided tour" highlights some of our contributions with specific examples. It 
starts with the NATREX model of equilibrium exchange rates. A measure of 
misalignment is Φ t derived based upon this model. The relation between the Purchasing 
Power Parity hypothesis and the NATREX is explained. An example shows how the 
NATREX model explains the medium to longer run movements in the real exchange rate 
of the Dollar-Synthetic Euro. 
The second part of the guided tour is the analyses of both optimal short-term and 
long-term external debt. A measure of excess debt Ψ t is derived in each case. Early 
Warning Signals of a debt crisis, derived from the theoretical analyses, are given for 
emerging markets and Latin America. The discussion of the United States external debt 
and current account deficits, which is the subject of the last chapter, is not included in this 
guided tour. 
 
 Equilibrium Exchange Rates and Misalignment 
An equilibrium
8 exchange rate is where the exchange rate is heading. The concept 
and measure of the equilibrium exchange rate depends upon the time horizon and the 
underlying model. Several reasons have been cited in the literature
9, why it is important 
to estimate equilibrium exchange rates. First, there are significant and sustained 
movements in exchange rates. For example, see figure 5.1 that graphs the U.S. 
dollar/euro exchange rate. These movements affect the competitiveness of the economies 
and their macroeconomic stability. One wants to know whether these movements are 
ephemeral or whether they are responding to "real fundamentals"
10. This information is 
important because the answer has implications for rational macroeconomic policy and for 
rational investment decisions. If the depreciation of an exchange rate is due to a 
depreciation of its equilibrium value, then exchange market intervention or a restrictive 
monetary policy designed to offset the depreciation is counterproductive. 
                                                 
8 It is not edifying to say that at every moment of time the exchange rate is determined by supply and 
demand, unless one can explicitly explain  in terms of measurable variables  what are their determinants 
and their evolution over time. 
9 See for example the analytical survey article by Driver and Westaway. 
10 The current controversy about the Chinese exchange rate revolves around the questions: what will be the 




 Second, in the case of monetary unions such as the Euro area, it is important to 
know how a potential entrant should select its exchange rate. An "overvalued" rate will 
depress growth and produce problems such as beset the eastern part of Germany. An 
"undervalued" rate will generate inflationary pressures. The measure of "over-valuation" 
and "under-valuation" must contain an explicit measure of an "equilibrium" real 
exchange rate.  
Our emphasis is upon the equilibrium real exchange rate. It is defined as the 
nominal exchange rate times relative prices. In an adjustable peg regime, the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed and the actual real exchange rate varies due to changes in relative 
prices. In a floating exchange rate regime, both the nominal exchange rate and relative 
prices can lead to adjustments in the actual real rate. The only difference from our point 
of view is that the adjustment of the actual real exchange rate to the equilibrium will be 
faster when the exchange rate floats, because the nominal exchange rate is more flexible 
than relative prices.  
A widely used approach in the literature is to "explain" the exchange rate by the 
uncovered interest rate parity theory (UIRP)
11. It states that the anticipated appreciation 
of the exchange rate is equal to the anticipated interest rate differentials over a period of a 
given length. There are several limitations of this approach. First: the UIRP equation 
concerns the change in the exchange rate but does not contain any information 
concerning where the exchange rate is heading. As Driver and Westaway state, the 
exchange rate at any given time t will jump around to adjust to any change in either the 
anticipated exchange rate at some future date t+h or any change in anticipated interest 
rate differentials over the interval (t, t+h). The UIRP theory per se has no anchor. 
Second: for the theory to have significance one must tie down the anchors. One 
anchor must be the "equilibrium" exchange rate and the second must be the path of the 
interest rates. This is not done in the UIRP theory. 
Third: the theory states that the interest rate differential at time t is a good and 
unbiased predictor of the subsequent change in the exchange rate. The "tests" of the 
theory generally relate ex-post changes in the exchange rate to the previous interest rate 
                                                 
11 See MacDonald (1999, pp. 36-38) and Driver and Westaway (section 4.1) for critiques of this theory. See 




differentials. In general, the results of these tests are not encouraging. The interest rate 
differential has the incorrect sign and is unsuccessful in predicting exchange rate 
movements
12.  
For these reasons, authors who are interested in explaining exchange rates focus 
upon the anchor, the equilibrium exchange rate - where the exchange rate is heading. 
Then the theory of UIRP has structure. The actual exchange rate at time t is equal to the 
present value of the equilibrium exchange rate, where the discount factor is the interest 
rate differential. There are two types of candidates for the equilibrium exchange rate. One 
is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which assumes that the equilibrium real exchange rate 
is a constant. As mentioned above, this hypothesis is unimpressive as an explanation of 
the anchor
13. 
 The other candidate is an equilibrium real exchange rate that depends upon time 
varying real, measurable "fundamentals"
14. This has led to the literature of " equilibrium 
exchange rates", which was given great impetus by John Williamson's influential book 
(1994). The logic of this approach goes back to Ragnar Nurske's article. The 
"equilibrium" exchange rate is the exchange rate that is associated with both external and 
internal balance. Anticipations, speculative capital movements and changes in reserves 
are excluded from the concept of an equilibrium exchange rate, which is where the 
exchange rate is heading. The NATREX model of equilibrium exchange rates generalizes 
the work of Williamson and Nurske. It is a Neoclassical growth model, whose underlying 
equations are based upon intertemporal optimization by the private sector, but not the 
government whose decisions are political. 
The NATREX explains the fundamental determinants of the medium run 
equilibrium and the dynamic trajectory to the long run equilibrium. In the medium run 
equilibrium there are both internal and external balance. In both the medium run and 
longer run the NATREX equilibrium real exchange rate satisfies equation (1), subject to 
constraints. The constraints are that there is internal balance, where the rate of capacity 
utilization is at its longer term mean, and external balance where the real rates of interest 
                                                 
12 A large literature is devoted to "rationalizing" the failure of the UIRP theory but does not test their 
conjectures in an objective manner. 
13 A clear summary of the failure of the PPP and evaluation of the econometric work is in Breuer (1994, 
esp. pp. 273-74). 




at home and abroad are equal, there are neither changes in reserves, nor speculative 
capital flows based upon anticipations. The equilibrium real exchange rate is the mean of 
a distribution, which is based upon real fundamentals. The mean will vary over time due 
to endogenous changes in capital and external debt, as well as changes in the exogenous 
real fundamentals. Deviations from this mean are produced by speculative factors 
involving anticipations, by cyclical factors, lags in adjustment, and interest rate 
differentials. These disequilibrium elements average out to zero. These deviations 
produce considerable variation but their effects are ephemeral.  
The terms in square brackets are that investment less saving (It - St) plus the 
current account is equal to zero. Investment less saving is the non-speculative capital 
inflow. The current account (Bt - rtFt) is the trade balance Bt less transfers of interest and 
dividends rtFt. The net external debt is Ft and rt is the "interest/dividend" rate. The 
international investment position consists of equity, portfolio investment and direct 
investment. The debt Ft is the negative of the net international investment position. 
Measure investment, saving and the debt as fractions of the GDP. 
(1) [(It - St) + (Bt - rtFt)]  = 0  
All of the authors who take the equilibrium real exchange rate approach use 
equation (1) to determine the exchange rate. The main differences among them concern 
their treatment of the two terms. Some work with a concept of what is a "sustainable" 
current account such that the debt does not "explode". As is discussed in the chapter on 
the United States current account deficits, their estimates are subjective, so their 
equilibrium exchange rate is a "normative" concept. The NATREX approach is quite 
different in several respects, primarily because the endogenous current account generates 
an evolving external debt, which feeds back into the medium run equation (1). A 
trajectory to longer run equilibrium is generated. The other difference is that the 




The dynamics of the debt/GDP ratio Ft is equation (2), where g is the growth rate. 
The current account deficit is the change in the external debt. The real exchange rate 
affects the trade balance B in equation (1), and the trade balance affects the evolution of 
the actual debt ratio in equation (2). There is a dynamic interaction between the 
endogenous real exchange rate and debt ratio. 
 (2) dFt/dt = (It - St) - gtFt = (rtFt - Bt) - gtFt = (rt-gt)Ft - Bt 
In longer run equilibrium, the debt ratio stabilizes at a value that satisfies equation 
(3). The trade balance Bt is sufficient to finance the interest plus dividend transfer on the 
debt net of growth (rt-gt)Ft. A negative debt is net foreign assets. 
(3) (rt-gt)Ft - Bt = 0. 
The longer-run equilibrium real exchange rate Rt* and debt/GDP ratio Ft* are 
endogenous variables that satisfy both equations (1) and (3). They are written as (4) and 
(5) to indicate that they both depend upon the real fundamentals Zt.  
(4) Rt* = R(Zt) 
(5) Ft* = F(Zt). 
We call dynamic stock-flow model equations (1) - (3) the NATREX model, 
which is an acronym for the Natural Real Exchange Rate
15. This is a model of positive 
economics. The literature associated with Williamson's FEER uses equation (1) and does 
not contain the dynamic interactions, equations (2) and (3). The NATREX model derives 
the private saving, private investment and trade balance equations from optimization 
criteria. There is no presumption that the government saving and investment decisions are 
optimal, since they are based upon political considerations not upon social welfare.  
 
Populist and Growth Scenarios 
The NATREX model is a technique of analysis
16. The purpose of the model is to 
understand the effects of policies and external disturbances upon the trajectories of the 
equilibrium real exchange rate Rt and equilibrium debt ratio Ft ,which depend upon the 
vector of fundamentals Zt. Insofar as the fundamentals vary over time, the equilibrium 
real exchange rate and debt ratio will vary over time, as indicated in equations (4) and 
                                                 
15 The NATREX appellation was suggested by Liliane Crouhy-Veyrac who compared the model to 
Wicksell's "natural" rate of interest. 




(5). The logic and insights of the NATREX model can be summarized in two scenarios. 
Each scenario concerns different elements in the vector Zt of the fundamentals, and has 
different effects upon the equilibrium trajectories of the real exchange rate NATREX and 
of the external debt. NATREX analysis concerns the equilibrium real exchange rate and it 
is neither the actual real exchange rate nor the optimal exchange rate that would lead to 
the optimal debt ratio. 
The first scenario, called the Populist scenario, involves a decline in the ratio of 
social saving/GDP. This could occur when the government incurs high-employment 
budget deficits, lowers tax rates that raise consumption, or offers loan 
guarantees/subsidies for projects with low social returns. This represents rise in the 
consumption ratio/a decline in the saving ratio, a shift in the S function in equations (1) 
and (2). These Populist expenditures are designed to raise the standards of 
consumption/quality of life for the present generation.  
The second scenario, called the Growth scenario, involves policies designed to 
raise the productivity of capital. Policies that come to mind involve the liberalization of 
the economy, increased competition, wage and price flexibility, the deregulation of 
financial markets, improved intermediation process between savers and investors, and an 
honest and objective judicial system that enforces contracts. Growth policies improve the 
allocation of resources and bring the economy closer to the boundary of an expanding 
production possibility curve.  
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the two scenarios in the medium and 
the long run. The stories behind the dynamics are as follows. 
The Populist scenario involves increases in social (public plus private) 
consumption relative to the GDP. External borrowing must finance the difference 
between investment and saving.  The capital inflow appreciates the real exchange rate 
from initial level R(0) to medium run equilibrium R(1), where T = 1 denotes medium run 
equilibrium. The current account deficit is balanced by the capital inflow. The debt rises, 
since the current account deficit is the rate of change of the debt - equation (2). Current 
account deficits lead to growing transfer payments rtFt. This Populist scenario is 




deficit, which then increases the debt further. The exchange rate depreciates, and the debt 
rises, steadily.  
Stability can only occur if the rise in the debt, which lowers net worth equal to 
capital less debt, reduces social consumption/raises social saving. For example, the 
growing debt and depreciating exchange rate force the government to decrease the high 
employment budget deficit. Thereby, saving less investment rises. Long-run equilibrium 
(denoted by T = 2) is reached at a higher debt F(2) > F(0) and a depreciated real 
exchange rate R(2) < R(0). The longer-run depreciation of the exchange rate R(2) < R(0) 
can be understood from equation (3). The debt is higher than initially. Therefore, the 
trade balance B(2) must be higher than initially to generate the foreign exchange to 
service the higher transfers
17 rtF(2). The real exchange rate must depreciate to R(2) < 
R(0) in order to raise the trade balance to B(2).  
                                      Table 1 
NATREX dynamics of exchange rate and external debt: Two Basic Scenarios 
Scenarios 
R = real exchange rate (rise is appreciation), F = 
external debt/GDP; initial period T = 0, medium run 
T=1, long-run T=2.  




 T = 1 
Longer-run 
T = 2 
Populist:  
Rise in social in social consumption (discount rate, 
time preference), rise in high employment government 
budget deficit, decline social saving 
 
appreciation 
R(1) > R(0) 
Debt rises 
F(1) > F(0) 
depreciation 
R(2) < R(0) < R(1) 
Debt rises 
F(2) > F(1) > F(0) 
Growth oriented:  
Rise in productivity of investment, expansion of 
production possibility set. Rise in growth, rise in 
competitiveness 
appreciation 
R(1) > R(0) 
Debt rises 
F(1) > F(0) 
appreciation 
R(2) > R(1) > R(0) 
Debt declines 
F(2) < F(0) < F(1) 
 
 
                                                 




The    Growth scenario is summarized in the lower half of table 1. The 
perturbation is a rise in the productivity of investment and an expansion of the production 
possibility set. Investment rises because of the rise in the rate of return. The difference 
between investment and saving is financed by a capital inflow. The exchange rate 
appreciates to R(1) > R(0) which reduces the trade balance and produces a current 
account deficit. The initial current account deficit equal to [I(0) - S(0)] raises the debt. 
The trade deficit provides the resources to finance capital formation, which raises the 
growth rate and the competitiveness of the economy.  
It does not matter much where the rise in the return on investment occurred or 
what factors led to an expansion of the production possibility set. If they are in the 
traditional export or import competing sectors, the trade balance function B = B(R;b) 
increases. The B function, which relates the real value of the trade balance to the real 
exchange rate R, increases with a rise in the overall productivity of the economy. For 
example, the reallocation of resources leads to the production of higher quality/value 
goods that can compete in the world market. If the rate of return on investment and 
productivity increase in the sectors that are not highly involved in international trade, 
resources can then be released for use in the more traditional "tradable" sectors. Again, 
the B function supply curve increases.  
The trajectory to longer-run equilibrium differs from that in the Populist scenario. 
The crucial aspect implied by the Growth Scenario is that, at medium run equilibrium 
exchange rate R(1), the trade balance function increases. The real exchange rate 
appreciates and there are now current account surpluses, excess of saving over 
investment. As a result, the debt then declines to a new equilibrium F(2) < F(0). The 
trajectory of the debt is not monotonic. The net effect in the longer-run can be understood 
from equation (3). The debt is lower, the growth rate is higher and the trade balance 
function B has shifted to the right. The long-run equilibrium exchange rate must 
appreciate to reduce B to equal the lower value of (r-g)F*.  
The dynamic process in the Growth scenario is summarized in the lower half of 
table 2. The real exchange rate appreciates steadily to a higher level R(2) > R(1) > R(0). 
The external debt reaches a maximum and then declines to F(2) < F(0) < F(1).  




 The Nominal Exchange Rate: PPP and the Equilibrium Exchange Rate Models 
 
The most frequently used estimate of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is 
based upon the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis. The PPP arbitrarily assumes 
that the equilibrium real exchange rate is a constant. PPP cannot and does not purport to 
explain what determines the equilibrium exchange rate, what are the effects of 
policy/control variables and exogenous variables upon the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
Hence it is not particularly useful for policy questions. For example, PPP is unable to 
answer the following significant questions: At what exchange rate should the CEEC enter 
the Euro area, to avoid the problems that occurred with the integration of East Germany? 
What policies will be consistent or inconsistent with the established exchange rates to 
avoid deflationary or inflationary pressures? How can one explain the trends in the values 
of the Euro and the US dollar?  
The "equilibrium exchange rate" literature
18 takes a very different point of view. 
The NATREX model implies that one would observe PPP in the long-run only if R(Zt) in 
equation (4), a linear combination of the fundamentals, is mean reverting in the longer 
run. The PPP model is a special case of the NATREX model. The relation between the 
PPP and the equilibrium exchange rate models can be understood from figure 1 and 
equation (6). The logarithm of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate
19 denoted log N
e
t 
has two components: the logarithm of the equilibrium real exchange rate, log R[Zt] which 
is the NATREX, and the logarithm of the ratio of relative domestic/foreign "prices"
20 
denoted log [pt/p*t]. The PPP ignores the R(Zt) term by assuming that it is a constant, and 
focuses exclusively upon the relative price term. The NATREX is not a constant, but 
varies with the vector of fundamentals Zt that underlie the saving, investment and trade 
balance functions.  
(6) log N
e
t = log R[Zt] - log [pt/p*t].  
Figure1 describes three values of R(Z), where R(1) is the most appreciated 
NATREX, R(2) is the most depreciated value and R(0) is the mean NATREX. Suppose 
                                                 
18 This is the approach taken by Williamson, Clark and MacDonald among others. NATREX is in the set of 
these models. 
19 A rise in the nominal or real exchange rate is an appreciation of the currency. 




that Z = 0 and the corresponding equilibrium real exchange rate NATREX is R(0). Then 
the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is a set of points along line R(0). The PPP relation 
would hold as long as the NATREX remained constant. If the nominal exchange rate 
were above the line R(0), the currency is overvalued. There cannot be internal and 
external equilibrium. The country would have difficulty competing in international 
markets. It would either lose reserves and the external debt/GDP ratio would rise, or there 
would be depressed economic conditions, particularly if the monetary/fiscal authorities 
attempt to stem the excess demand for foreign exchange. Similarly, if the nominal 
exchange rate were below the line, then reserves would rise or there would be 
inflationary pressures. Nominal exchange rates either above or below the line are 
unsustainable. Either the nominal exchange rate or relative prices must adjust, if both 
internal and external equilibrium are to prevail.  
 
 
Figure 1. The equilibrium nominal exchange rate the NATREX and relative prices. If the 
NATREX varies between R(1) and R(2), and relative prices vary between c and d, the 





The NATREX changes with the fundamentals vector Zt, as described in the two 
scenarios summarized in section table 2. As the NATREX varies between R(1) and R(2) 
and relative prices vary between c and d, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate will be 
contained in the rectangle. A regression of the nominal exchange rate upon relative prices 
would be based upon the scatter of points in the rectangle. If the relative prices are 
constant at log [pt/p*t] = 0, then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate varies from a to b. 
If the nominal exchange rate is fixed at log Nt = 0, then relative prices must vary between 
c and d. 
 
Example:  The Euro - United States Dollar Exchange Rate 
  With the introduction of the Euro in 1999, there was a multitude of predictions 
concerning its future value relative to the U.S. dollar. Most of the predictions were that 
the Euro would appreciate - be a "strong currency" - as institutions diversified their 
portfolios away from the dollar. However, the Euro depreciated from $1.16 in January 
1999 to $0.87 in February 2002. Then the predictions switched towards pessimism about 
the value of the Euro. However, the Euro appreciated to $1.34 in December 2004. This 
appreciation caused consternation because it adversely affected the competitiveness of 
the European economies. Pressures were exerted upon the European Central Bank to 
offset the appreciation with an expansionary monetary policy. In June 2005, the Euro was 
trading at around $1.20. 
The standard theories were not able to explain these trends. As explained in the 
Preface, researchers in Europe examined to what extent the NATREX model could 
explain the movements in the Euro. In particular, the staff of the European Central Bank 
had to decide whether the euro was or was "misaligned". The strategy of the researchers 
was to construct a "synthetic euro", which is a weighted average of the currencies of the 
countries in the Euro area, from the beginning of floating in the 1970s to the advent of the 
Euro. Chapter five is devoted to an evaluation of research concerning the Euro exchange 
rate, and compares the NATREX explanation with other approaches. 
The NATREX model states that the fundamental determinants of the real 




consumption ratio, relative productivity of investment, and relative productivity of labor 
in the pair of countries considered. The economic explanation of how these fundamentals 
affect the NATREX is the two scenarios. The signs of their medium run and long run 
effects are specified in table 1.  
The model in equations (1)-(4) has been tested and applied in several ways. The 
structural equation approach estimates the components, saving, investment, and trade 
balance equations to obtain the medium run equilibrium NATREX from equation (1). 
Then, that solution is used in the dynamic equation (2) to obtain the long run NATREX 
from equation (3). The reduced form approach just concentrates upon the dynamics of the 
real exchange rate. There is an excellent correspondence between the implied dynamic 
process and the Vector Error Correction econometric approach. The long run NATREX 
equation (4) is the hypothesized cointegrating equation.  
Using the fundamentals Zt for the Euro area relative to the US, one obtains an 
estimate of the NATREX labeled R(Z). The coefficients have the signs specified in the 
model, table 1. Thus we have an estimate of the equilibrium real exchange rate. Adding 
the relative price variable, we obtain an estimate of equation (6)/figure 1 for the 
equilibrium nominal value of the Euro. A rise is an appreciation of the Euro or a 
depreciation of the United States dollar.  
Figure 2 graphs the actual nominal value of the synthetic euro (EUUSNERMA = 
$US/euro) and the estimate of the equilibrium nominal value (NOMNAT), based upon 
the NATREX model. The NATREX is a model of the equilibrium exchange rate, not the 
actual exchange rate. The actual exchange rate is hypothesized to converge to a 
distribution whose mean is the equilibrium exchange rate. The equilibrium rate varies 
according to figure 1/equation (6) - because there are both shifts in the R(Z) curve as well 
as movements along the curves due to relative prices. Since the equilibrium nominal 
exchange rate varies with both vector Zt and relative prices (pt /pt*), price stability alone 
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Figure 2. Nominal value synthetic euro (4 Q MA), $US/Euro = EUUSNERMA; 
NATREX estimate, equation (6) is NOMNAT, 1970 to 2000.  
 
Figure 2 shows the undervaluation of the synthetic euro (the overvaluation of the 
$US) in the first half of the 1980's, and in the period after 1996. Estimates of the 
equilibrium value of the Euro from 1999 - 2001 indicated that it was undervalued relative 
to the $US. This estimate is consistent with the significant appreciation of the Euro since 
2001. The euro appreciated from $0.85 in 2001 to $1.29 in November 2004. 
The NATREX model is a useful guide to policy. Insofar as the fundamentals Z - 
relative social consumption ratios, relative productivity and relative returns on capital - 
have not changed drastically, the NATREX real exchange rate should be relatively 
constant. Insofar as relative prices also have not changed much, the NATREX nominal 




equilibrium exchange rate. Speculative forces based upon anticipations, political events 
such as referenda, cyclical effects and monetary policies will produce deviations from the 
equilibrium. However, these are transitory effects that should wash out. Exchange market 
intervention, which attempts to drive the exchange rate from the NATREX will be 
ineffective for the reasons given above. 
This explanation of the Euro rate is the subject of chapter five, and a similar 
analysis is developed in chapter six for the exchange rates of the transition economies in 
Eastern Europe. 
 
Optimal Debt Models 
Many studies conclude that external borrowings, particularly by commercial 
banks and firms, were among the key factors responsible for the severity of the East 
Asian crises in the late 1990s. In particular, the authors argue that short-term capital 
flows are volatile and hence the size of foreign currency denominated debt contributes 
significantly to the occurrence of currency and debt crises. The volatility of exchange 
rates is strongly affected by the stock of external debt. 
Countries have both short-term and long-term debt. The inter-temporal 
optimization problem arises because the debt occurred to finance consumption and 
investment at one time affects the consumption possibilities at a later date. This choice is 
seen in balance equations (7) and (8). The optimal amounts of debt differ according to 
whether it is short-term or long-term.     
In the case of short-term investment if the borrowing is at time t then it must be 
repaid with interest at later date s = t + ∆ t .  In the case of long-term investment, the debt 
does not have to be repaid at any terminal date, but must be serviced regularly. Equation 
(7) describes the change in the debt dLt. External debt Lt rises because consumption  t C  
plus investment  t I  plus the debt service  tt rL exceeds  t Y  the GDP.  Alternatively, the 
change in the debt is ( ) tt I Sd t − , investment It less saving St = Yt - rtLt - Ct over the period 
of length dt.   




The actual debt is generated by the decisions of the government and the private 
sectors. Fiscal and monetary policies are important determinants of investment and social 
saving by the private plus public sectors. In the Latin American countries the debt has 
risen due to high consumption and/or low social saving by the public plus the private 
sectors.  In the Asian countries industrial policy stimulated private investment. The 
excess of investment less saving led to a capital inflow and an increase in the external 
foreign currency denominated debt. There is no presumption that these decisions - which 
produced the capital inflow dLt - have been optimal, as is clear from the recurrence of 
debt and balance of payments crises in South-East Asia and Latin America.  
The external debt has to be serviced and that would clearly affect future 
consumption.  We can see this by writing consumption at some later time s = t+dt, in 
equation (8) below. It is another way of writing equation (7), but at a later date. 
Consumption is equal to the GNP, which is equal to the GDP less the debt service Ys - 
rsLs, less investment Is plus new borrowing dLs. The new borrowing is the net capital 
inflow in the form of either direct investment, portfolio investment or short term bank 
flows.  
(8) Cs ds = (Ys - rsLs - Is )ds +  dLs 
It is important to have a benchmark, what is the optimal debt, so that we can 
compare the actual to the optimal debt. Thereby we would obtain an Early Warning 
Signal, Ψ t = ft - f*t above of a crisis. Three elements must be specified to solve the inter-
temporal optimization problem. Different models involve different specifications of these 
three elements.  
•  The constraints and controls/policy decisions.  
•   The dynamic stochastic process 
•   The optimality criterion  
In chapter two, the debt is modeled as short-term corresponding to bank loans. In 
the model discussed in chapter three, the debt is long term, which would correspond to 
direct investment or long-term portfolio investment. The major theoretical difference 
concerns the constraints, so that the mathematical analysis is very different in each case. 
They must be modeled differently, and one case cannot be modeled as a special case of 




In the short-term debt model sketched below, debt is incurred in period t =1 which 
has a maturity at period t =2. It is a repeating two period model. There are several 
constraints. First: at maturity, the debt must be repaid with interest. Second: the capital at 
the beginning of period t =3 must be the same as it was at the beginning of t =1, so the 
process is repeated. Third: consumption in period t =2, when the debt is repaid, must 
exceed a certain minimum - regardless of the state of nature. This is a "no bankruptcy" 
constraint. The argument is that, if the attempt to service the debt would reduce 
consumption below the minimum - which we arbitrarily set at zero - then the country 
would default. Faced with a choice: (a) repay debt and drastically reduce the standard of 
living, or (b) default but do not drastically reduce the standard of living, the economy 
would select the second option. The controls/policies are the consumption, investment 
and resulting debt in period t =1, subject to the constraints. 
In the long-term model of chapter three, sketched below, there is no maturity to 
the debt but it must always be serviced. It is an infinite horizon model in continuous time. 
The controls - debt, capital and consumption - are constantly adjusted to keep these 
control/policy variables at their derived optimum levels. The constraints are that: 
consumption always be positive, regardless of the state of nature, and that net worth is 
always positive. The latter avoids Ponzi schemes, where new borrowing is used to service 
a growing debt. Inter-temporal optimization in the long-term model involves the use of 
dynamic programming. 
In both cases, a debt crisis is produced when the actual debt significantly exceeds 
the constrained optimal debt. The actual debt is generated by saving and investment 
decisions by the private and public sectors, which may be far from optimal. The economy 
is more vulnerable to external shocks when the actual debt significantly exceeds the 
constrained optimal debt. 
The second specification concerns the stochastic process. We model the two 
sources of uncertainty that ultimately affect consumption. The first source of uncertainty 
is the ratio of GDP per unit of capital Yt/Kt and the second source is the real rate of 
interest rt. Two stochastic variables real GDP and real interest rate, which will affect 
consumption at the later date, are written in bold letters in equation (8). Each one is 




falls to a minimum level then consumption in equation (8) may have to be reduced - 
unless there is new borrowing to offset the decline.     
The output/capital ratio Yt/Kt = bt  has a deterministic component b, which is the 
mean return on capital, and a stochastic component with a zero mean and a significantly 
positive variance. The deterministic component b corresponds to the slope of a regression 
of the growth of GDP on the ratio of investment/GDP, and the stochastic part 
corresponds to the standard error of estimate. This stochastic part contains the "Solow 
residual", variations in the rate of capacity utilization resulting from fiscal and monetary 
policies, variations in the terms of trade and the composition and quality of the 
investments. 
The second source of uncertainty concerns the real interest rate rt required to 
service the external debt  t L .  For countries other than the US - such as emerging market 
countries - the real interest rate in terms of consumer goods  t r  has three components. The 
first is the interest rate on US Treasury long-term debt. The second is the premium on 
dollar denominated debt charged to sovereign borrowers. The third is the anticipated 
exchange rate depreciation of the currency. A currency depreciation increases the amount 
of consumer goods that must be sacrificed to service/repay the foreign currency 
denominated debt. The equation for the real interest rate contains two terms: the first term 
is deterministic with a mean real rate of interest r and the second term is stochastic with a 
positive variance.  
The expectations of the stochastic terms are equal to zero, but the productivity of 
capital and real rate of interest may be correlated.  In developed countries such as the 
United States and Europe, the correlation is generally positive. In periods of rapid 
growth, there is a rise in investment demand and demand for money; and interest rates 
rise. When there are financial crises, such as occurred in Asia or Latin America, the 
growth of GDP and real interest rate are negatively correlated, for the following reason. 
A decline in GDP may occur because of a decline in the terms of trade and/or the 
anticipated return on investment turns out to be an illusion and the asset bubble collapses. 
The stochastic term in the productivity of capital equation is negative.  Since firms 
borrow primarily from the banks to finance real investment and the banks in turn 




a domino effect is created in the event of a financial panic.  When debtors are unable to 
repay their loans to the banks, the banks in turn are unable to repay their loans to 
international creditors.  Financial panic leads to a short term capital flight.  The 
government may try to stem the outflow by using the dollar reserves, but that is only a 
stopgap measure.  Sooner or later the monetary authorities will raise interest rates and, 
when that fails to stem the outflow, the currency will depreciate.  The depreciation of the 
currency implies that the real rate of interest to repay a debt denominated in foreign 
currency rises. In that event, the stochastic term in the real interest rate equation is 
positive.  The situation is exacerbated when banks also denominate their loans to the 
domestic firms in US dollars. Firms would find it very difficult to service debts 
denominated in foreign currency because they are faced with both a rising nominal rate of 
interest and a depreciating currency. A negative correlation between the productivity of 
capital bt and the real rate of interest rt makes an external debt very risky. 
Faced with these sources of uncertainty, how then should a country select its 
optimal debt and level of consumption? The third specification concerns the optimality 
criterion. One criterion is that the controls are selected to maximize the expectation of the 
discounted value of a concave utility of consumption over the appropriate horizon. A 
second criterion is that the debt and capital are selected to maximize the expected value 
of the growth rate of consumption over a horizon, subject to the constraint that the ratio 
of consumption/net worth is a positive constant. A third criterion is a very conservative 
one. The controls are selected to maximize the minimum expected value of the utility of 
consumption
21. Only the first two criteria are used in this book. 
 
 Short-debt model in Discrete Time Finite Horizon 
For many countries, short-term capital flows are important in financing 
investment less saving and have been associated with crises, such as in Southeast Asia 
1997-98. In this part, we sketch the derivation of the optimal investment, consumption 
and debt in the short-term capital movements model, which is the subject of chapter two. 
Explicit equations for excess debt Ψ t and Early Warning Signals of a debt crisis are 
stated. We provide specific examples of how this analysis can explain the default risk in 
                                                 




emerging market countries and Latin America. Detailed empirical application of the 
Short-debt model is the subject of chapter seven. 
The model assumes two repeating discrete time periods. In period one, the 
country has a stock of capital K1 and a Gross Domestic Product Y1. The controls are 
consumption C1 and investment I1. If consumption plus investment is greater than the 
GDP, the country incurs an external debt L1 to finance the difference. If consumption 
plus investment is less than the GDP the country is an international creditor, and the debt 
L1 is negative. The debt, or net foreign assets, bears a known real rate of interest
22. At the 
second period, the debt plus interest must be repaid. We consider a repeating two period 
model, so that the capital at the beginning of period three must be the same as it was at 
the beginning of period one. This constraint means that the sum of investment over the 
two periods must be zero. 
The productivity of capital Yt/Kt = bt is a stochastic variable. When the investment 
decision I1 is made in period one, the productivity of capital in period two b2 = Y2/K2 is 
unknown. Capital in period two is the capital at the beginning of period one plus the 
investment made in period one. Two possibilities are considered. Either the productivity 
of capital in period two b
+ exceeds the interest rate r, with probability 1 > p > 0, or the 
productivity of capital b
- is less than the rate of interest with probability (1-p).  
The debt in period one L1 finances investment I less saving S. The stochastic 
variable b2 is written in bold letters. Consumption in period two C2 is equal to the GDP in 
period two Y2 = b2K2 = b2 (K1+ I1) less the repayment of the debt plus interest (1+r)L1 
plus the disinvestment to make capital at the beginning of period three equal to the initial 
capital K1. Equation (9) describes consumption C2 in period two. Since the return on 
capital can assume two values: b
+ > r in the good case, and b
- < r in the bad case, 
consumption in period two can assume either C2
+ in the good case or C2
- in the bad case.  
(9) C2 = b2K1 + [(1+r)(b1K1 – C1)] + (b2 – r)I1. 
There are three components to consumption in period two, equation (9). If there is 
neither saving (S1 = b1K1 - C1) nor investment in period one – if consumption is equal to 
GDP in the first period – then consumption in period two would just be the GDP in 
period two Y2 = b2K1.  
                                                 




If there is saving but no investment in period one, then consumption in period two 
is the sum of the first two terms. The saving is invested abroad at the known rate of 
interest, and permits the economy to consume [(1+r)(b1K1 – C1)]. This term is not 
stochastic. 
If there is investment in period one, then the additional consumption available in 
period two is the stochastic net return times the investment- the third term  (b2 – r)I1.  
If the bad state of nature occurs b2 = b2
- < r then the burden of the debt resulting 
from (b
- - r)I1 could depress consumption C2 to an intolerable level. In that case, the 
country would default rather than accept the required reduced standard of living.  
The constrained optimization decision is to select the controls: consumption C1 > 
0 and investment I1 > 0 during period one to maximize the expectation over the stochastic 
variable b2 of the discounted value of utility over the two periods. We assume a HARA 
utility function, U(C) = (1/γ )C
γ  , with positive risk aversion (1-γ ) > 0. A special case that 
we use frequently is γ  = 0, so that the utility function is logarithmic U(C) = log C. The 
great advantage of using the HARA function, particularly in the long-term model in 
chapter three, is that one can solve for the optimal controls analytically. Otherwise, the 
optimal controls are solved numerically by using a computer. 
An important constraint is that there should be no default. This means that 
consumption in period two, in the bad case, should exceed a minimum tolerable level C2
- 
> Cmin > 0.  
The solution of the Short-debt model is the subject of chapter two. The 




upon the logarithmic case, with risk aversion equal to unity, where the results are clear 
 
 
Figure 3. Optimal debt/capital f= L1/K1  is curve ABDEF.   
Expected net return x = E(b – r) = [pb
+ + (1-p)b
- ] – r. Along ABD the country is a 
creditor. Along DEF the country is a debtor. If debt/capital exceeds f-max, the probability 
of default is (1-p)>0. 
 
Optimal saving/capital is a constant independent of the expected net return x = 
E(b – r). Optimal investment/capital is zero for expected net return x < a in figure 3. Risk 
premium a is related to the ratio of the possible loss from investment in capital relative to  
the return if all wealth were invested abroad at the safe return. This means that, for x < a, 
the country will be a creditor and will invest all of its saving abroad earning the safe rate 
of return r > 0. The debt/capital will be f-min  < 0, where the country is a creditor.  
When the expected net return rises above a, investment will be positive, thereby 
reducing the capital outflow. When the expected net return x = D, investment will equal 
saving and the country will neither be a creditor or a debtor. When x > D, then 




optimal ratio f = debt /capital > 0. The constraint that there be no default means that there 
is a maximal debt, f-max, such that in the event of a bad state of nature b2 = b
-, the level 
of consumption would exceed Cmin.  
 
Summary Short-debt model 
Curve ABDEF is the constrained optimal ratio debt/capital, in the short-term 
capital flow model. Expected utility is maximized along this curve. Insofar as the debt 
deviates from the curve, expected utility is reduced. The optimal debt is a benchmark of 
performance. Debt crises result because the actual debt deviates from the optimal debt. If 
the debt exceeds f-max, due to non-optimal behavior of the public and private sectors, 
then with probability (1-p) > 0 consumption will be less than Cmin and there will be a 
default. Alternatively, the likelihood of default rises continuously as the utility of 
consumption C2 declines.  
 
Example: Emerging Markets 
In chapter seven, emerging market countries during the period 1979-2001 were 
divided into two groups: those that defaulted/renegotiated their debts with either official 
or private creditors
23 and those that did not. The relation between the debt/GDP ratio and 
the expected net return did not accord with the optimal ratio in figures 3 in either set of 
countries examined (renegotiate/no-default). The main difference between the two groups 
concerned the excess debt, ω  = (f - fmax), the deviation between the actual debt/GDP ratio 
from the maximal debt/GDP ratio. The fmax is calculated in chapter seven, based upon the 
short-term stochastic optimal control model in chapter two. 
When there is an excess debt - the debt ratio ft above the line f-max in figure 3 - 
the economy is vulnerable. In the event of a bad shock, the level of consumption would 
fall below the minimum and would default. The bad shock will occur with probability (1-
p). In the empirical applications of the short-term capital model to emerging markets, a 
Warning Signal  ω  = (f - fmax)  is equation (10).  Α  "flashing red" Warning Signal of a 
debt crisis occurs when ω > 0.   
                                                 
23 Define default/renegotiation as a condition where the scheduled debt service is not paid on the due date 




(10) ω t = ft - fmax  
 Default is often a political decision, where international organizations and foreign 
countries are directly involved in bailouts and debt forgiveness. In the absence of 
bailouts, the excess debt is a sufficient condition for default. Our results based upon panel 
data were that: 
In the cases where the debt was rescheduled/defaulted, the excess debt was 
positive in 84% of the cases. In the cases where there was no excess debt, default 
occurred in 17% of the cases. 
A specific example concerns Mexico and Tunisia. Mexico defaulted to official 
and to private creditors during the period 1983-96, whereas Tunisia did not. Table 2 
describes the relevant data from which one can infer that Mexico was more likely to 
default than Tunisia. 
 
Table 2.  Mexico and Tunisia 1979 - 2001 
Variable  Mexico - default  Tunisia - no default 
Debt/GDP  f  0.45  0.61 
Mean net return (b-r)  0.057  0.107 





2  2.23 13.21 
ω  = f - (fmax)  0.322 -0.116 
 
Compare table 2 with the summary above. First: Tunisia, which did not default, 
had a higher debt ratio than did Mexico, which defaulted. Second: the risk adjusted net 
return z was very much higher in Tunisia. Third: the Mexican debt ratio was above the 
maximal debt f-max in figure 3.  The excess debt, which leads to a probability of default 
in the bad case, is ω  in the last row. It is very large and positive. By contrast, Tunisia did 
not have an excess debt. The ω  for Tunisia was negative; the debt ratio was below the 
debt-max level. 




 Dynamic Programming Optimization in long-term debt models 
For many countries the main obligations to foreigners arise from direct 
investment and portfolio long-term debt and equity investment. These forms of "debt" 
have no maturity date, but must be serviced regularly with interest and dividend 
payments. The modeling of optimal long-term debt in continuous time over an infinite 
horizon is very different from the modeling of short-term debt in discrete time described 
in above. In the long-term debt model, there is no maturity date. Bankruptcy can only 
occur if net worth, to be defined below, is negative. The optimal controls will prevent that 
from occurring, but the actual behavior may be non-optimal. 
Consumption and the growth of the debt are described by equations (7) and (8) 
above. The two sources of uncertainty are the productivity of capital and the real interest 
rate, which may be correlated. First, the optimality criteria are discussed. Second, we 
describe two models with alternative stochastic processes concerning the sources of 
uncertainty: the Prototype Model and the Ergodic Mean Reversion Model. Third, we 
indicate why the literature that uses the "inter-temporal budget constraint" (IBC) is 
inadequate. Fourth, we explain why and how we use the Dynamic Programming analysis. 
Fifth, the conclusions concerning the optimal debt/net worth ratio, capital/net worth ratio 
and consumption/net worth are stated. Sixth, we give an example of the implications of 
the DP analysis by providing Early Warning Signal of Argentine crisis of 2000-2001. In 
chapter eight, we give an example of the interaction of an overvalued currency and 
excess debt in producing the Asian crises 1997-98. 
 
 Optimality Criteria 
Several reasonable optimality criteria are used in the mathematical finance 
literature. Usually the criterion is to select the control/decision variables, consumption, 
debt or capital subject to constraints, to maximize the expectation (E) of the discounted 
value of a concave utility of consumption U(Ct) over an  horizon (0,T), where T may be 
infinite or finite. These are equations (11a) or (11b). In the infinite horizon case, the 
discount rate is δ  > 0.The expectation is taken over the stochastic variables: the 




Analytic solutions of the dynamic programming equation can be obtained if the 
utility function is HARA
24 described in equations (11a) and (11b). The coefficient of risk 
aversion is (1-γ ) > 0. The lower is γ , the greater is the risk aversion. Negative and zero 
values of γ  imply considerable aversion to risk. In the case where γ  < 0, the utility of a 
zero consumption is minus infinity. When γ  = 0, the utility function is logarithmic.  
(11a) J1 = E ∫ 
T  Ct
γ /γ  e
-δ t dt        γ  ≠  0      T > t > 0 
(11b) J2 = E ∫ 
T  ln Ct e
-δ t dt       γ  = 0     T > t > 0 
Two constraints are imposed. Consumption is always positive. Net worth must 
always be positive. Define net worth Xt > 0 as "capital" less debt. A negative debt is a 
financial asset. Unless constraint X > 0 is imposed, Ponzi schemes are possible: borrow 
to finance consumption and borrow more to service the debt. In that case, capital does not 
grow. As the debt continues to grow exponentially, net worth will be driven to negative 
values. The constraint that net worth is always positive precludes Ponzi schemes. 
There are two subjective variables, the discount rate and risk aversion. The 
discount rate is just another way of specifying the length of the horizon. A high discount 
rate places the emphasis upon what occurs in the near future, and essentially disregards 
the far future. A discount rate δ > 0  is necessary to derive a finite optimum over an 
infinite horizon if γ  > 0, whereas if γ  < 0, then a discount rate is not necessary to derive a 
finite optimum over an infinite horizon.  
Whenever the utility function is logarithmic, the optimal ratio of consumption/net 
worth equals the "discount rate". Consumption is social consumption, government plus 
private consumption expenditure. Low taxes and high government expenditures raise 
social consumption. Since the discount rate is arbitrary, this quantity can rationalize any 
social consumption policy. If populist policies lead to a high rate of social 
consumption/GDP, it can be "rationalized" as optimal policy with a high discount rate. 
Weight the present highly relative to the future. If the dictator, a Chairman Mao, follows 
policies that depress social consumption, it can be "rationalized" as optimal policy with a 
low discount rate. Weight the future highly relative to the present.  
                                                 
24 That is the reason that Merton used HARA. Otherwise, the DP equation must be solved numerically 




Criterion J3 in equation (12) does not involve the arbitrary discount rate. Quantity 
J3 is the expected growth rate of net worth over a horizon of length T, given any constant 
ratio c of consumption to net worth, Ct/Xt = c > 0. Since consumption is a constant 
fraction of net worth the maximization of J3 is the same as the maximization of the 
growth rate of consumption from an arbitrary initial level. 
(12) J3 = (1/T)E [ln XT/X | Ct/Xt = c > 0 ] 
 = (1/T)E [ln Ct/C| Ct/Xt  = c > 0],    X = X(0), C = C(0) 
Criteria J1 and J2 allow us to solve for both the optimum debt/net worth ratio, 
capital/net worth and the optimum consumption/net worth, whereas criterion J3 only 
allows us to solve for the optimal debt/net worth and capital/net worth. We explain in 
chapter three that the same optimal ratios of debt/net worth and capital/net worth are 
obtained whether we use criterion J2 or J3.  
There is another criterion, which reflects extreme aversion to risk. The 
consumption in any period depends upon both the controls/decision variables  - 
consumption, capital or debt - and the stochastic productivity of capital. Suppose that 
there is a finite set of productivities of capital and a corresponding likelihood function. 
The Max-min criterion of optimality is to select the controls that maximize the minimum 
expected values of consumption for very large values of risk aversion. Fleming (2005) 
analyzes this very conservative case. 
 
 Stochastic Processes      
The sources of uncertainty are modeled as stochastic processes in continuous 
time. The prototype model assumes that both the productivity of capital bt and the world 
real rate of interest rt can be described by statistical functions such as Brownian motion
25 
with drift. The mean return on investment is b, but there is no mean reversion. The 
change in the return to investment from one "period" to the next is purely random with a 
zero expectation, Brownian motion. Similarly, there is a world real rate of interest at 
which the country can borrow or lend. The mean is r, but there is no mean reversion. The 
                                                 
25 A Brownian motion process has independent increments that are normally distributed. The expectation is 




change in the real rate of interest from one "period" to the next is just the Brownian 
motion. 
An alternative stochastic process is that the productivity of capital is still 
Brownian Motion with drift but that the world real interest rate, dependent upon a large 
vector of factors, is described by Ergodic Mean Reversion. This stochastic process is 
described by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equation, which states that the change in the real 
rate of interest from one "period" to the next is not completely random. One part is a 
reversion to the mean, and the second part is Brownian motion. The net result is that the 
real rate of interest is normally distributed and converges to a distribution whose mean is 
r with a positive variance. Mathematically, it is easy to reverse which variable is 
described by Brownian motion with drift, and which is described by Ergodic Mean 
Reversion. The stochastic processes in the two models are summarized. 
 
Return on investment bt    real interest rate rt 
Prototype model    Brownian motion with drift  Brownian motion with drift 
Ergodic mean reversion  Brownian motion with drift   Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
 
In chapter three, we derive the optimal debt ratio and consumption ratio in the 
Prototype model. In chapter nine, where we evaluate the United States current account 
deficits and debt ratio, we explain how the equations for the optimum differ in the two 
cases: prototype model, ergodic mean reversion. 
 
 Inter-temporal Optimization: Stochastic Optimal Control, Dynamic Programming 
 The standard approach in the economics literature concerning inter-temporal 
optimization is to maximize the expectation of the discounted value of the utility of 
consumption subject to an "Inter-temporal Budget Constraint" IBC.  The inter-temporal 
case is treated as the analogue of the standard deterministic case of consumer choice. In 
the timeless case, the consumer has a utility function over a vector of goods, leisure and 
services whose prices are given and the consumer has a fixed amount of resources, 
money and time. The constraint is that the choice is restricted to the amount of resources 




available are known when the choice is made. The IBC is of an entirely different nature. 
The object of an "inter-temporal budget constraint" is to prevent a "free lunch", or engage 
in a Ponzi scheme where debts are never repaid. The IBC imposed is a terminal 
condition. At finite date T> 0 the debts are cleared, debt LT = 0. We now explain why the 
IBC is inappropriate in a stochastic environment/a world of uncertainty. Instead, one 
must use the techniques of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming. 
From equation (7), the debt LT at time T is the initial debt L(0) plus the sum of the 
excess of expenditures for consumption Ct plus investment It plus interest on the debt rtLt 
less Gross Domestic Product Yt. The IBC is that the debt is paid off at the terminal date. 
The condition that LT = 0 implies the IBC, the sum of absorption (Ct + It) is equal to the 
sum of the Gross National Product (Yt - rtLt). 
The stochastic variables (in bold letters) are Yt the real GDP and rt the real 
interest rate. Given the uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital and real interest 
rate, the future is unpredictable.  At any time s < T when the debt is Ls, how can anyone 
know if any country will/will not be, violating the IBC?   
The IBC is unknowable, unenforceable and is a non-operational concept. If a 
country has a debt L(0) at the present, how can one know if the IBC will be satisfied even 
if a given policy - a sequence of investment and consumption - is followed? The reason is 
that Yt, rt the real GDP and interest rate are stochastic variables with Brownian Motion 
components. For example, when the price of oil (during the oil crises periods) was high 
the oil producing countries and the oil importing countries expected it to continue. In the 
former huge investment and consumption projects were undertaken in the expectation 
that the real GDP would remain high. In the oil consuming countries, costly energy 
saving policies were imposed. These anticipations did not materialize and the oil 
producing countries were saddled with large debts.  
This profound deficiency of the IBC approach led Fleming and Stein
26 to use 
dynamic programming DP approach
27, which features prominently in this book. 
 
                                                 
26 Fleming and Stein (2004), Fleming (2004) and Stein (2004). 
27  The seminal work was by Bellman The DP approach is generally used in the mathematical finance literature, 




The Dynamic Programming DP/Stochastic Optimal Control Approach SOC
28 
 
Our underlying models are Markov diffusion processes where the future evolution 
of the system depends upon the present state and not at all upon the paths leading up to 
the present state. The system is stochastic, unpredictable. Even if one specified the 
controls/decisions
29 from the present to any future date, the future is unpredictable 
because there are many paths that the system can take due to the stochastic processes 
describing the real GDP and the real interest rate. At each instant of time the 
"controller/decision maker" knows the state of the system, and only has information up to 
the present. Since, the controller cannot anticipate the future, the DP approach involves a 
multi-stage decision process. The principle of optimality of DP is that: whatever the 
initial state and the initial decisions are, the remaining decisions must constitute an 
optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision. In a stochastic 
system, the optimal controls selected at any time depend upon the current information 
available and enter as feedback functions of the currently observable state. This is very 
different from the IBC approach. 
The state variable in the stochastic systems discussed in this book is net worth Xt 
defined as "capital" Kt less debt Lt. The change in capital is investment over the period, 
and the change in the debt is equation (7). The latter involves the stochastic variables, the 
productivity of capital and the real rate of interest.  
The DP solutions of the optimization of the expected discounted value of utility 
(J1, J2 in equations 11a, 11b), given the stochastic processes, involve the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation discussed in chapter three. The DP analysis of inter-
temporal optimization is quite technical, however the optimal debt/net worth f in the HJB 
equation can be explained in terms of the well known Tobin Mean-Variance M-V model. 
The optimal debt/net worth ft in the HJB equation is chosen to maximize 
component W, equation (13).  
(13) W = maxf [Mean - (risk aversion) Risk]. 
                                                 
28 This section is an intuitive discussion of chapter three, which is based upon techniques used in the 
mathematical finance literature.  




The Mean term M(ft,ct) is a linear function of the debt ratio and the consumption 
ratio. It is the percentage change in net worth
30 if there were no uncertainty. Risk is R(ft) 
and (1-γ ) is risk aversion. The risk term concerns the variance of the percent change in 
net worth. In the logarithmic cases (γ  = 0), risk aversion is unity. Term R(ft) contains the 
variances of the productivity of capital, the interest rate and their correlation. Stochastic 
term R(ft) is a quadratic function of the debt ratio. A unique optimal ratio of debt/net 
worth is derived that maximizes J1 or J2 in equations (11a) and (11b). This maximization 
involves the maximization of W, which can be interpreted as M-V expected utility. A 
graphical explanation of equation (13) presented in chapter three provides the intuition 
behind the DP results.  
 
Implications of the DP solution of the long-term debt model 
The Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming analysis is used to derive 
the inter-temporal optimal conditions. The debt/net worth ratio ft = Lt/Xt = f* that 
maximizes performance criterion J1, equation (11a) is the one that maximizes equation W 
in (13). The derived optimal debt in equation (14) is a benchmark measure of 
performance in a stochastic environment. Net worth is capital less debt. Therefore, the 
optimal ratio k* of capital/net worth is k* = f* + 1. In the logarithmic case J2 equation 
(11b) where risk aversion (1-γ ) = 1, the optimum debt/net worth is:  
(14)  f* = (b-r)/ σ
2  + f(0),  σ
2 = var (bt  - rt).   
Several crucial variables are in this equation. First, variable b is the mean 
productivity of capital or return on investment, r is mean real interest rate. In the 
logarithmic cases J2 and J3 risk aversion (1 -γ ) = 1. Variable σ
2 is the variance of the 
quantity (bt - rt), the current productivity of capital less the current interest rate, so that it 
also contains a covariance term. The intercept f(0) is the optimal ratio of debt/net worth 
that minimizes risk. When the correlation coefficient between the growth rate and interest 
rate is less than the ratio of the standard deviation of the productivity of capital/standard 
deviation of the interest rate, the intercept f(0) is negative. The optimum debt ratio f* in 
the Prototype model is equation (14), which is our benchmark of performance. Equation 
                                                 




(14) is graphed in Figure 4 as line U-S.  The debt ratio f = L/X is plotted on the ordinate 
and the risk adjusted mean net rate of return z = (b-r)/σ
2 is plotted on the abscissa                                    
  
 
Figure 4. Optimal Ratio Debt/Net Worth f* is line U-S, when risk aversion is unity. In the 
Prototype model, the risk adjusted net return z = (b-r)/σ
2 ,  σ
2 = var (bt - r t). Optimal 
capital/net worth k* = 1 + f*. 
              
                    Summary and implications of the DP analysis
31 
Consider two countries, which differ greatly in terms of wealth and income. There 
is no necessary relation between per capita wealth and the risk adjusted mean net return z 
= (b-r)/σ
2.  In rich/developed country I, the risk adjusted mean net return z = z1 and in 
poor/emerging market country II the risk adjusted mean net return z = z2. In the situation 
described in figure 4, it is optimal that the poor country should be a creditor of the rich 
country because the mean return per unit of risk z = (b-r)/σ
2is higher in the rich country. 
                                                 




Either the mean net return (b-r) is higher or the risk σ 
2is lower in rich country I than in 
poor country II. 
 The expected growth of net worth and consumption is maximal, for any 
consumption ratio, when the debt/net worth ratio
32 is optimal at f*. As the debt ratio rises 
above the line U-S which describes the optimum f*, the expected growth rate declines, 
and the risk - the variance of the growth rate - increases.  
 Objective measures of vulnerability to external shocks are implied by the 
analysis. Vulnerability is taken as a situation where, if the debt is to be serviced, 
consumption must be reduced when there are external shocks. Say that consumption is a 
constant proportion of net worth. This proportion may or may not be "optimal". As the 
actual debt ratio rises above the optimum, say because non-optimal policies are 
undertaken by the public sector, the expected growth rates of net worth and consumption 
decline and their variances rise. The probability of a decline in consumption rises and the 
probability of a debt crisis increases continuously as the debt ratio exceeds the optimum. 
Therefore, the vulnerability to shocks increases continuously as f rises relative to f*. 
 The level of the ratio
33 of debt/GDP per se is not a relevant variable in producing 
a crisis. Instead it is the excess of the actual debt ratio over the optimal f* that raises the 
probability of a crisis. A Warning Signal Ψ t = (ft - f*), based upon available information, 
is that the debt ratio is rising above line U-S in figure 4.  When the mean net return per 
unit of risk z = (b-r)/σ
2 is falling, the optimal debt ratio should be declining. If, however, 
the debt/GDP ratio is rising because non-optimal policies are followed, it is more 
probable that the debt ratio lies in the region above the curve U-S. 
                                                 
32 The ratio of capital/net worth  is equal to 1 plus the debt ratio. 
33 The ratio of h = debt/GDP is positively related to the ratio f* = debt/net worth. The equation is:  
h = (1/b)f/(1+f), where b is the mean productivity of investment. Therefore, one can speak of the ratios f 




Example:  Argentina: From Triumph to Defaults 
Severe crises result from an interaction between an excess debt and a misaligned 
exchange rate. The interaction between them is the subject of the Asian crises chapter 
eight. In the present section, we give an example of how we apply the SOC/DP analysis 
of excessive debt to Argentina that went from Triumph in the early 1990's to Tragedy in 
2001. Warning Signals are based upon estimates of excess debt Ψ t = ft - f*t using 
available information.  
Michael Mussa's (2002) retrospective description
34, and the International 
Monetary Fund's Independent Evaluation Office Report (2004), of the Argentine crisis 
can be integrated with the SOC/DP analysis above. A new economic policy - the 
convertibility plan - was instituted in the spring of 1991 to deal with the hyperinflation 
that existed at the beginnings of the 1990s. The currency was pegged to the $US and a 
currency board arrangement limited domestic money creation. This plan was successful. 
During the period 1993-98, the inflation rate was below 3% and the growth rate was 
about 4% per annum. Whereas most of the miracle Asian economies collapsed into crisis 
from mid 1997 to early 1998, Argentina became the darling of the world credit market. It 
was able to float large issues of medium to long-term debt on the world credit markets at 
comparatively modest spreads over the US Treasuries. 
Not only did the world credit markets and the International Monetary Fund 
applaud the Argentine policies, but also several academic economists viewed Argentina 
as a model of growth. Dornbusch (Lecture II: 1998) wrote: "A currency Board 
arrangement, a fixed exchange rate and a central bank that has no discretionary power 
over the money supply…is a very good system…One spectacularly successful case…is 
Argentina…the Argentine experience is the one that deserves most attention because, 
one, it has lasted, and two, it has been extremely successful as a cornerstone of reform in 
an economy, and three, it has produced an average growth of six per cent". 
Barely a few years later in 2001, Argentina's decade long experiment ended in 
tragedy. The banking system was effectively closed at the beginning of December 2001, 
the exchange peg was gone, the peso was trading at substantially depreciated rate against 
the $US. Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt and was transformed within barely 
                                                 




two years from the darling of the emerging market finance to "the world's leading 
deadbeat". 
The reason why the financial markets, the International Monetary Fund and 
academic economists failed to anticipate the crisis was that their attention was focused 
upon the monetary sphere - since inflation is a monetary phenomenon - and not upon the 
external debt. The debt did not alarm them because the debt did not seem to be high 
relative to that prevailing in many industrial countries. A benchmark of an excessive debt 
was lacking. Our analysis implies that debt crises are not produced by the level of the 
debt/GDP but by the excess of the actual debt over the optimum debt ratio. 
 The fundamental causes of the disaster were the growth in social (public plus 
private) consumption and a fixed nominal exchange rate pegged to the $US. The various 
levels of the Argentine governments succumbed to political pressures to spend 
significantly more than was raised by taxes. Much of the fiscal problems arose because 
the provinces retained the initiative for public spending, but the central government was 
ultimately responsible for raising revenues and servicing the debt. Since Argentina was 
thought of so highly by the financial markets, it was able to finance the excess spending 
by borrowing US dollars in the international markets at favorable interest rates.  
An excess debt means that the debt ratio rises above the curve U-S in figure 4. In 
the Prototype model, the optimal debt ratio is equation (14). A relatively general way of 
taking all of these factors into account is to graph the normalized variables. The 
normalized return to investment b*t = [bt - E(b)]/σ b labeled B1_AR in figure 5. It is the 
deviation of the return from its longer-term mean per unit of risk
35. The external $US 
denominated debt/GDP, labeled DBTGDP_AR in figure 5, is also normalized. It is equal 
to the (debt/GDP - mean)/standard deviation. The debt ratio rose by two standard 
deviations from 1992-2001. However, the return on investment bt was declining from 
1997-2001.  
The rise in the actual debt ratio and the decline in bt the return/risk in figure 5 
corresponds to a rise in the debt ratio above the curve U-S for the optimal debt ratio in 
                                                 
35 In general, in the equation for optimal debt the variance is multiplied by risk aversion. In the logarithmic 
case it is unity, as in equation (14). There is also a constant f(0) in equation (14). By using normalized 
variables, we are evaluating excess debt relative to its average value over a long period, where risk aversion 




figure 4. An "excess debt" is generated. Insofar as there is an excess debt, the expected 
growth rate of GDP declines and its variance rises. The variance comes from the external 
shocks, which are disturbances to the productivity of capital (GDP/capital), the real rate 
of interest, and their correlation. Because of the non-optimal government policies, the 
Argentine economy became more vulnerable to shocks of the net return from its longer- 
term mean.  
The major shock was the collapse of Brazil's crawling peg early in 1999, which 
led to a negative shock to the Argentine productivity of capital. When Argentina was 
forced to depreciate its currency- abandon the peg - the real rate of interest was positively 
shocked, because the debt was denominated in $US. Consumption would have to be 
reduced, if Argentina was to service her debts. Confronted with this choice, Argentina 
defaulted.  
Our conclusion is that there was an Early Warning Signal (EWS) of a sustained 
excessive debt, based upon available information. The debt ratio per se is not an EWS, 
whereas the excess debt Ψ =  f − f∗  is an EWS of a debt problem/crisis/default/ 
renegotiation. Theoretically this is the movement of the debt ratio above the curve US, 
and empirically it is that b*t = (bt - mean)/st. dev is falling significantly but the debt/GDP 
ratio is rising significantly for a period of years. This approach allows for gradual 
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The contribution of this book has been to answer the following questions.  
•  What is a theoretically based empirical measure of a "misaligned" exchange rate 
that increases the probability of a significant depreciation or a currency crisis? 
•  What is a theoretically based empirical measure of an "excess" debt that increases 
the probability of or a debt crisis?  
•  What is the interaction between an excess debt and a misaligned exchange rate? 
 
In this Overview chapter we sketched the theoretical framework and gave several 
examples of how the theoretical analysis is applied. This book reflects interdisciplinary 
work that has been undertaken with co-authors. The NATREX model was developed and 
applied with co-authors who are economists. The use of stochastic optimal control and 
dynamic programming to explain optimal debt and endogenous growth was developed 
with co-authors who are mathematicians. 
Chapters 2-4 are theoretical and chapters 5-9 are applications of the theoretical 
material. A detailed application of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming for 
long-term debt in continuous time is in chapter nine concerning the United States current 
account deficits. The Argentine example above just gives a flavor of the approach. The 
short-term debt model is applied to the emerging market countries in chapter seven. The 
interaction between misaligned exchange rates and excess debt is applied to the East 
Asian crises. The application of the NATREX model to the Euro-U.S. dollar exchange 
rate is chapter five, and to the real exchange rate of the transition economies in chapter 
six.  
Now that the reader has had a guided tour of some of the highlights, he can read 
the rest of the book either systematically or selectively by choosing the chapter that is 
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